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injury.23 Consequently, it is inevitable that an increased number of
claims are going to arise under the limitation clauses now contained
in the majority of medical coverage provisions.
ERIC L.

SISLER

LIKELIHOOD OF INJURY TO BUSINESS REPUTATIONA LIBERAL STANDARD OF PROOF IN
UNFAIR COMPETITION?
It is scarcely a novel observation that courts have been hard pressed
to maintain the delicate balance between social interests in preserving
competition and equally important social interests in prohibiting
unfair trade practices. Clairol, Incorporated v. Cody's Cosmetics, Incorporated,1 decided under common law principles of equity and
Massachusetts' "anti-dilution and injury to business reputation"
statute, calls attention to a unique fact situation in determining the
scope of protection to be given against unfair trade practices in that
state. The case presents an issue of first impression: Can a manufacturer who sells identical products, except for labels and packaging, in two different channels of trade at different prices, enjoin a
noncontracting party, in this instance a discount house, from violating its marketing system? Clairol asserted that this violation would
result in likelihood of injury to its business reputation and thereby
placed principal reliance on a statute providing:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution
of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall
be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of
confusion as to the source
competition between
2 the parties or of
of goods or servies.
Clairol sought to enjoin Cody from selling certain of Clairol's
products marked for "Professional Use Only" to general consumers.
Clairol sells the product in two different channels of trade and at
different prices. One channel is through retail jobbers for ultimate
resale by retail establishments to the public for home use; the other
is through beauty supply jobbers for resale to professional hair10.70 (3d ed. 1967).
21
L. GoRDY, R. GRAY, ATroRNEY's TExTBOOK OF MEDICINE,
See generally Fickling, Long Term Treatment of Facial Injuries, 22 J. ORAL
SURGERY 142 (1964).

'231 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1967).
2
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 1o § 7A (1947).
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dressers and beauty schools. The contents of each type are exactly the
same. The retail bottles, however, are individually packaged in a
distinctive yellow carton with which the product has become associated
in the minds of consumers. Each carton has a pamphlet of easily understood instructions and its label contains warnings as to use. Cody
bought professional bottles from wholesalers and then sold them to
the general public. Clairol distributed these bottles uncovered in
cartons of six rather than individually packaged, which contained
only one instruction sheet per carton. Cody sold these at a price substantially lower than the other retail sales of Clairol products.
Clairol's product deteriorates upon exposure to heat or light,
therefore the plaintiff has adopted a standard shelf life. Each carton
sold at retail and each professional bottle bears a stamp date beyond
which the product cannot be safely used. There is some evidence that
some of Cody's sales bore use expiration dates that had expired.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that because Cody's merchandising
procedure caused exposure of bottles to heat and light the expiration date did not reflect the true life expectancy of the product. In
addition, the restricted professional use bottles were formerly marketed
to conform in exact detail with those to be sold at retail to the public.
Clairol later abandoned this procedure as an economy move.
The trial court found that there was no evidence of complaints or
injuries to consumers arising out of Cody's sales. Nevertheless, it
found that Cody's sales of professional products were extremely likely
to injure Clairol's business reputation or dilute the distinctive qualities of its trade name or trademark. 3 The court concluded that Clairol
was at fault in failing to exercise sufficient control over its wholesalers
to prevent sales to discount houses like Cody. However, being uncertain of the law, the trial judge reported the case to the Supreme
Judicial Court for review and instructions.
The reviewing court agreed with the assessment of the lower court
that there had been no adulteration of Clairol's product by Cody in
the usual sense. 4 It also pointed out that Clairol might have benefited
by self-help in returning to its original marketing method or by
policing its wholesalers. It concluded that compliance with the state
Fair Trade Act might have solved Clairol's problem. But the court
recognized the possibility that Clairol's reputation may be injured in
the event of a substantial number of poor results arising from inex'231

N.E.2d at 915.

'See Coca-Cola Co.

v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); Coca-Cola Co. v.
J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
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perienced use of the professional bottles. While refusing an absolute
injunction, it granted Clairol limited relief. The court felt that reasonable protection would be given if Cody were enjoined from selling the
product unless it furnished with each professional bottle sold at retail:
(1) a legible printed statement containing precise state and federal
statutory warnings, (2) a statement indicating in enumerated ways
how Cody's marketing methods differ from those of Clairol and (3) a
specified statement as to satisfactory use and health hazards.
Clairol reveals the uncertainty that pervades the whole area of
unfair competition. It raises a basic question of what practices will
constitute unfair competition and what measure of relief should be
given in a specific instance. In meeting this problem, the courts have
had no exhaustive list of practices which fall below accepted standards
of commercial morality to guide them in reaching an equitable result. The tendency seems to be in the direction of enforcing increasingly higher standards of fairness and commercial morality among
businessmen. 5
Absent statutory changes, early common law cases of unfair competition turned on whether there had been a "palming off," that is,
a passing off of the product of one producer as that of another. 6
Today the law of unfair competition has been extended to apply to
misappropriation of property; i.e., appropriating to one's use and
commercial advantage the results of the enterprise and efforts of
another.7 Clearly, there was no attempt by Cody to palm off the
products of Clairol. The problem here is one of possible misappropriation.
rSee Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 1oi N.Y.S.2d 483, 488 (Sup. Ct. sg5o). In Metropolitan the court commented
that the law of unfair competition developed within the framework of a society
dedicated to free competition, and to deal with business malpractice offensive to
the ethics of that society. For a discussion of the philosophy underlying the development of the law of unfair competition see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Introductory Note ch. 35 at 535 (1938); Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813 (1927); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA
L. REV. 175 (1936).
OInternational News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
"With the passage of those simple and halcyon days when the chief business
malpractice was 'palming off' and with the development of more complex business
relationships and, unfortunately, malpractices, many courts, including the courts
of this state, extended the doctrine of unfair competition beyond the cases of
'palming off'. The extension resulted in the granting of relief in cases where there
was no fraud on the public, but only a misappropriation for the commercial
advantage of one person of a benefit or 'property right' belonging to another."
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 1o1
N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 195o).
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Perhaps the leading common law case that broadened the scope of
protection under the rubric of misappropriation is InternationalNews
Service v. Associated Press.8 There the plaintiff at great expenditure
of labor and capital gathered and distributed the news among its
members. The defendant, a rival, pirated the news and sold it in
the Wgest after the initial publication by the plaintiff in the East.
There was no palming off, since credit was given to Associated Press,
and the case presented additional difficulty because of the public
interest in the dissemination of news. The court held, however, that
one who gathers news at great expense for the purpose of publication
may be said to have a quasi-property right in the results of his enterprise, as against a rival in the same business, irrespective of the public
interest. In strong language, the court branded defendant's conduct
as an attempt to reap where it had not sown. The rationale was that
a court of equity will protect against unauthorized interferences with
the normal operation of a legitimate business precisely at the point
where profit is to be reached. InternationalNews was not specifically
cited by Clairol, but it would seem to be applicable to the facts of
the case. The court in Clairol allowed Cody to benefit from Clairol's
efforts and suggested that reasonable standards of fairness would be
met if Cody were to make a disclosure of the true facts.
The court in Clairol placed much emphasis upon disclosure, but
interferences with the operation of a legitimate business have been
frowned upon even where there is full disclosure by the defendant.
In Bayer Company v. Sumner Printing Company,9 aspirin tablets distributed by the producer in large packages were sold by the defendant
in packages of two under a facsimile of the original trademark. While
there may be elements 'of confusion in the case, the court appeared
to be more concerned with the effect of defendant's activities upon
the plaintiff's right in his regular retail sales. The court put the
matter this way:
The plaintiff is not required to submit to a new and wider
use of its product by a merchandising practice which tends to
confuse or deceive the public, and which will impair or prejudice its regular sales under its trade-mark and standard display, and in its original packages. 10
The court concluded this method constitutes unfair competition
even though defendant placed a strip across the front of the package
stating the real facts in small print.
8248 U.S. 215 (1918).
'7 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1934).
'OId. at 742.
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A basic consideration in Clairol was whether a manufacturer has
any rights in the product once it has been released for sale. There
are common law authorities that have answered this question
affirmatively, and have granted absolute relief against an unauthorzed
use upon the ground that such restrictive legends as "Professional
Use Only" impose an implied equitable servitude upon the chattel
that binds the defendant. 11 In a leading Pennsylvania case, 12 records
bearing the legend "not licensed for radio broadcast" were broadcast
in violation of the restriction. The court cited with approval International News and observed that the publication of the records was
limited to purchasers for home use.
Thus, the protection of enterprise and good will have been secured
by various judicial devices. In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has somewhat unsettled the premise that one may not share
in the good will of a manufacturer of a trademarked product. The
Court in Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Company'3 and Compco
Corporationv. Day-Brite Lighting, Incorporated14 denied relief even
though there was a strong likelihood of confusion and an implicit
misrepresentation of the origin of the goods involved. In both, the
defendant copied the plaintiff's design and produced a product identical to the one copied. While the court acknowledged that a state
may, in appropriate circumstances, require precautionary measures
such as labeling, it is powerless to prevent the actual copying of the
unpatented article itself. These decisions have been interpreted as
permitting a sharing of the good will of the producer as well as that
of his product.1
While the contours of general common law principles under which
Clairol sought relief are unclear, there have been statutory advances
"See Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420, 346 P.2d 505 (1959).
Nadell held that dealers in goods damaged in transit, which had agreed with
the carrier not to permit such goods to enter retail outlets under manufacturer's
label, had created an enforceable equitable servitude which could be enforced
against persons who had notice of the restriction even though they were not in
privity with the contractual agreement. See also Chafee, The Music Goes Round
and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956);
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1928); 17 WAsH.
& LEE L. REV. 272 (1960).
"Waring v. WVDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631, 638
(1937). See also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 1o1 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 195o).
"376 U.S. 225 (1964).
"376 U.S. 234 (1964).
"Handler, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1178,
1183 (1964).
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in dealing with the problem of unfair trade practices. The statute
relied upon by Clairol may be seen as another attempt to broaden the
scope of available protection. Under the statute, it is no longer necessary to show that the parties are engaged in direct competition 0 or
that there is confusion as to the source of goods. 17 Yet in Clairol the
court was unable to find any preceding cases decided under the statute
that did not involve some element of possible confusion. The court
appeared to be upon the horns of a dilemma: "We do not suggest
that such possible confusion is essential either to general equitable
relief or to relief under § 7A, but thus far no authority indicates what
other equitable considerations will justify granting injunctive relief
under § 7 A."'1
Thus the Massachusetts court was not inclined to grant a permanent injunction against the sales by Cody even in view of the fact that
the statutory changes had liberalized the common law. A liberal reading of the statute would appear to require a mandatory injunction
once Clairol had successfully shown likelihood of injury to business
reputation. In refusing to use the statute to break new ground, the
court appeared to be relying upon the balancing of hardships that has
characterized traditional equity relief. This doctrine has been followed
in such a variety of circumstances that limited relief in unfair competition cases may be said to be a rule of practice.' 0 Moreover, in Esquire,
Incorporatedv. Esquire Slipper Manufacturing Company,20 a federal
court retained the discretionary element in the construction of the
Massachusetts statute. It construed § 7 A as permitting, but not requiring, injunctions grounded on dilution, consistent with the traditional flexible equity practice of granting or withholding relief in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. The court held that the question

"6Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949).
17Compare Esquire Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 228, 232-33
(D. Mass. 1956) with Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7 th Cir. 1963).
Cir. 1963).
'8231 N.E.2d at 916. For early cases decided under the statute see Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., 351 Mass. 283, 218 N.E.2d
564 (1966); Great Scott Food Mkt., Inc. v. Sunderland Wonder, Inc., 348 Mass.
320, 203 N.E.2d 376 (1965); Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 15o N.E.2d 551
(1958); see also Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7 th Cir. 1963).
"SS.M. Spencer Mfg. Co. v. Spencer, 319 Mass. 331, 66 N.E.2d 19 (1946); Cain's
Lobster House, Inc. v. Cain, 312 Mass. 512, 45 N.E.2d 397 (1952). See Skil Corp.
v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 15o N.E.2d 551 (1958); Gould Eng'r Co. v. Goebel, 320
Mass. 200, 68 N.E.2d 702 (1946); Associated Perfumers, Inc. v. Andelman, 316
Mass. 176, 55 N.E.2d 209 (1944); Staples Coal Co. v. City Fuel Co., 3t6 Mass. 503,
55 N.E.2d 934 (1944)20139
F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1956).
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in each instance is the "quantum" of the protection to be accorded the
plaintiff and such is purely a matter of discretion.
Clairol sought to bolster its case for broad protection by introducing evidence of the scope of protection available in other jurisdictions.
While a majority of the statutes of other states are merely codifications
of the early common law,21 six states have adopted the statutory scheme
which exists in Massachusetts. 22 The New York courts, partly on the
'E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 57, § 93 (ig6o); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.140 (1963);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.030 (1959); ARIz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1442, 143 (1956).
These statutes deal with the general problem of unfair competition and are mainly
concerned with counterfeiting or imitating a trademark or trade name. Most
of the statutes have the same general language with only slight variations in
draftsmanship. Perhaps the most common language is:
(I) uses, without the consent of the registrant, a reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a trademark registered under.., his [sic]
chapter in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of
goods on or in connection with which the use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of the goods;
or (2) reproduces, counterfeits, copies or colorably imitates the trademark
and applies the reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements
intended to be used upon or in conjunction with the sale or distribution
in this state of the goods; except that under (2) of this section the
registrant may not recover profits or damages unless the acts are committed with knowledge that the trade-mark is intended to be used to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
ALAs1:-X STAT. § 45.50.170 (1962).
See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-1-11, -1-12 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, §§ 3307, 3308 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-402 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 506.10, -11 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAws § 204-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 4-1602, -605 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 66-142, -143 (1961); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 548.10 (1950); KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-121, -122 (1964); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 51-215, -216 (1950). ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1508 (1964); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 41, §§ 100, 101 (Rep. Vol. 1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.638(11) (Rev. Vol.
1957); MIINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.28, -29 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 4227-11, -12
(1956); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 85-104 (Rep. Vol. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
87-109, -110 (R.R.S. 1943); NEv. Rv. STAT. § 600.020 (1963); N.H. Rlv. STAT.
ANN. § 350-12 (Rep. Vol. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:3-10, -:3-11 (1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 49-4-11 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8o-8, -9 (Rep. Vol. 1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 47-22-11,
-22-12 (196o); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1329.65, -.66
(Baldwin 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 31, 32 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
647.095, -. 105 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 23,24 (Purdon 196o); R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §§ 6-2-2, -2-3 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-212, -213 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 69-507, -509 (1955); TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. art. 850 (Vernon 1948); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 70-3-13, -3-14 (1953); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 59-189.13, -189.14 (Supp. 1966); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2529 (1958); WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 19.77.140, -. 77.150 (Supp. 1965);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-3, -2-5 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.02, -. 033 (1957);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 40-3 (1957).
-ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-550 (Supp. 1967); CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 14340 (West's Supp.
1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c) (Supp. 1966); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 106-115 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140 § 22 (1964); N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 368-d (1968).
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basis of a penal statute23 and partly on the basis of a statute somewhat

similar to the Massachusetts statute,24 have given a greater measure
of relief in circumstances quite similar to those in Clairol.
A leading New York case is Clairol, Incorporated v. L. H. Martin
Value Center, Incorporated,25 where the court held that defendant's
sales to the general public of single bottles of Clairol products labeled
for the beauty trade violated the state's penal and statutory unfair
competition laws. The specific ground upon which relief was granted
was that the defendant was selling products of the plaintiff to the
public without the packaging and labeling which plaintiff had designed. Since this could cause unsatisfactory results and cheapen the
product in the public eye, the injunction forbade the defendant from
retailing any product bearing Clairol's trademark which departed
20
in any way from the manner approved by Clairol.
It is manifest that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
did not believe that Clairol was a proper case for broad relief, either
under general common law principles or under the state statute. The
court determined that three major considerations weakened Clairol's
case: first, the court's view that Clairol could return to its prior
practice of complete uniformity in professional and retail products,
and that this could be done at a difference of only about two cents
per bottle; second, the court's assertion that Clairol could also protect
itself by rigid supervision of its professional wholesalers to prevent
sales to Cody; third, the court's view that Clairol has failed to take
advantage of the state Fair Trade Act, under which it could have
executed contracts with its wholesalers setting the minium sale and
resale price of its products.2 7 Such a contract would be binding upon
2354(6) (1967).
"The New York statute provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or tradename shall be a ground for injunctive
relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in
cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods
or services.
N. Y. GEN. Bus. § 368-d (1968).
2-4o Misc. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963).
2OSee Clairol, Inc. v. Carlton Drug, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 652, 278 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1967) (mem.). See also Lanvin Parfums, Inc. v. Le Dans Ltd., 9 N.Y.2d 516,
215 N.Y.S.2d 257 (i96i). In Lanvin the defendant bought the plaintiff's product,
rebottled and repackaged it and sold it under the plaintiff's trademark at prices
far less than those charged by the plaintiff. The court held that such sales under
the plaintiff's trademark may be enjoined even though the labels used by the
defendant disclosed the fact of rebottling and the identity of the rebottlers.
-The pertinent provision provides:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears,
2N.Y. PEN. §
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anyone purchasing the product from wholesalers with knowledge of
28
the contractual agreement.
The language of the opinion indicates that noncompliance with the
Fair Trade Act might well have been the decisive factor in deciding
the measure of relief to be given Clairol. The court observed that
"[w]here there has been no compliance with a statute directly dealing
with price protection, we perceive no reason for applying c.iio, § 7A,
or general equitable principles, to afford such protection." 29
The court's justification for its position is not entirely persuasive.
It gives little weight to the fact that a legitimate business operation
on the part of Clairol is involved. Clairol has perfected its present
marketing system with a view toward assuring quality and efficiency
in the distribution and use of its product. To this end it has expended
a great deal of time and money and has acquired substantial good
will and business reputation. It must be remembered that the Clairol
product is a sensitive product to merchandise. There is evidence that
women are extremely timid about coloring their hair because it
might tend to affect their status, reputation and appearance. 30 Clairol
has successfully overcome this timidity by marketing its product in
such a manner as to insure the best possible results. The distinctive
yellow carton, which has become associated in the public's mind, serves
not only as attractive packaging, but also preserves the product from
the deteriorating effects of heat and light. The lack of this packaging
could be detrimental to both the quality of the product and the brand
image. As far as proper instructions are concerned, Clairol has provided them at retail, and there is reason to believe that hair-dressers
do not need them because of their professional knowledge. In light
of the efforts that have been expended, it is questionable whether
Clairol should be required to alter its marketing method.
or the label or container of which bears, or the vending equipment from
which said commodity is sold to consumers bears, the trade-mark, brand
or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is in
fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the commonwealth by reason of any of the following provisions which may be
contained in such contract: (i) That the buyer will not resell such
commodity except at the price stipulated by the vendor. (2) That the
producer or vendee of a commodity require upon the sale of such
commodity to another, that such purchaser agree that he will not, in
turn, resell except at the price stipulated by such producer or vendee.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93 § 14A (1954).

2Sce Eastman Kodak Go. v. E.M.F. Electric Supply Co., 36 F. Supp. iii (D.
Mass. 194o); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., lo9
F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1953).
-%231 N.E.2d at 918.
01Id. at 914.
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The impact of the court's decision upon Clairol leaves it with
several alternatives, each equally undesirable from Clairol's point of
view. Clairol may accept the decision and allow Cody to continue
the sales, but this would risk product liability under the doctrine of
Carter v. Yardley & Company.31 Carter held that the manufacturer
must show that he fulfilled his duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect the public. The danger of liability cannot be lightly dismissed.
The court also suggests that a second avenue open to Clairol is
that of policing its wholesalers to prevent sales to discount houses like
Cody. This course would be fraught with danger of violating the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and in view of recent developments the
legality of such a course seems highly questionable. United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Company,32 decided by the Supreme Court in 1967,
questions the legality of customer restriction as a means of preventing harm to a party in Clairol's position. In Schwinn the Court held
that the mere existence of such restrictions was sufficient to constitute
a violation of Section i of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.33 Under "the
rule of reason" Clairol would have to establish a case for an exceptional need to impose these restrictions. But it could only rely
upon this rule in cases where it retained the title to the products
under a consignment arrangement with its wholesalers. The disadvantage is that in retaining the title, Clairol would also be retaining
the risks.
Finally, compliance with the Fair Trade Act would drive Clairol
into an anti-competitive situation which would deprive it of the opportunity to maintain flexible pricing. This would also damage the
public interest in having Clairol free to discount its prices.
There is always the danger that salutary efforts to prevent business
malpractices may subvert the competitive process itself, but the interests of manufacturer and competitor must be balanced. Where the
court is free to exercise its discretion, the situation before the court
should be more carefully scrutinized so that a fair and equitable result
will be reached.
LESLIE D. SNIrrl, JR.

3

ig9 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
32388 U.S. 365 (1967).
3
Md. at 382.

